Gomorra (Matteo Garrone, Italy 2008).
“There are
no colorful characters in Gomorrah, Matteo
Garrone’s corrosive and ferociously unsentimental fictional look at Italian
organized crime; no white-haired mamas lovingly stirring the spaghetti sauce;
no opera arias swelling on the soundtrack; no homilies about family, honor or
tradition; no dark jokes; no catchy pop songs; no film allusions; no winking
fun; no thrilling violence....
... Instead, there is waste, grotesque human waste,
some of which ends up illegally buried in the same ground where trees now bear
bad fruit, some of which, like the teenager scooped up by a bulldozer on a
desolate beach, is cast away like trash” (Manohla Dargis, Lesser-Known Mobsters, as Brutal as the OldOnes, New York Times, February 12, 2009).
In late 2007, the Sicilian police found a list of “Ten Commandments” in the hideout of the mafia boss Salvatore Lo Piccolo. They are thought to be guidelines on how to be a good, respectful and honorable mafioso.
1. No one can present himself directly to another of our
friends. There must be a third person to do it.
2. Never look at the wives of friends.
3. Never be seen with cops.
4. Don't go to pubs and clubs.
5. Always being available for Cosa Nostra is a duty —
even if your wife is about to give birth.
6. Appointments must absolutely be respected.
7. Wives must be treated with respect (7.Thou Shalt
Not Commit Adultery)
8. When asked for any information, the answer must be the
truth.
9. Money cannot be appropriated if it belongs to others
or to other families.
10. People who can't be part of Cosa Nostra: anyone who
has a close relative in the police, anyone with a two-timing relative in the family, anyone who behaves badly and doesn't
hold to moral values.
Are we talking about blood ceremonies, obscure
symbols, elaborate codes? Is it the arcane remnants of a defunct culture?
According to Diego Gambetta’s The
Sicilian Mafia: the Business of Private
Protection (1996) Cosa Nostra ten commandments
can be considered norms and guidelines for a well working (criminal)
organization. Gambetta’s main thesis is that Mafia begins to resemble any other
business. In a society where trust is in short supply, this business sells
protection: a guarantee for commercial and social transactions. As you
understand, this is not a “mythical” interpretation. Mafia here is considered the logical response to existing market conditions.
Organized Crime either replaces the State or they coexist in the same
territory.
Cosa Nostra cannot be understood outside its
historical roots in Sicilian society. Mafia arose in mid 19th century
with the collapse of feudalism and landed aristocracy on one side; the
emergence of a new bourgeoisie and the unification of the Italian state on the
other. People belonging to the new upper class did not propose and support new
type of social development for Sicilian society; they just “moved into villas
of aristocracy” and assumed their values. Thus, the class that is the “engine”
of any modernization process, did not provide an economic, political and civic
leadership when aristocracy collapsed. According to Gambetta (and other
scholars) organized crime in Sicily (and in the South of Italy) can be considered
as the answer to the absence of a civil society — in other parts of Italy patronage
absolved a similar function. Therefore, Mafia arose in a liminal, transitional period: the old social-economical structure
was fading away but the passage to a new social-economical order with its legal
apparatus (the state) was not completed. In such historical period, Mafia
provided the needed protection for the emerging business and new landholding
class. Gambetta posits that Mafia protection was a substitute for the absence
of institutional and interpersonal trust. The lack of trust in the state is
considered as the “cultural spring” for Mafia uprise — the resemblance between
Sicily and Russia after the collapse of former Soviet-Union is sticking.
What about Camorra?
This is not a stalactite in a magnificent cavern close to volcanoVesuvio. This is Napoli Center underground, and the stalactites are the result of 200 years of waste disposal exhalations. A strong indicator of the historical presence of Camorra — and of well “grounded” detrimental social, political and cultural attitudes toward the public good (to the costs of people’s health, camorristi included). Camorra’s power structure is horizontal, unlike the hierarchical one of Cosa Nostra. Distinct clans operate largely autonomously without a single leader — each clan has its own boss. Alliances can be created between clans; that is when Camorra functions like a single organization. Coalitions are maintained only as long as there is equilibrium of power and reciprocal benefits. Sometimes, a inter-organized crime alliances can be created: the Casalesi, a group of confederate families, is allied with the Calabria 'Ndrangheta and Sicily Cosa Nostra. According to the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs (2009) Camorra counted between 100 and 200 clans, for approximately 10,000 formal members and 50,000 associate: an army. The area of operation in Italy is mainly in the following regions: Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Marche, Umbria, Molise, Lazio, Basilicata. Camorra’s international ramifications can be found mainly in: Eastern Europe, France, The Netherlands, Spain, Scotland, Portugal, Latin America (Colombia), United States, Canada. All of this to say: Camorra cannot be considered just a local phenomenon.
This is not a stalactite in a magnificent cavern close to volcanoVesuvio. This is Napoli Center underground, and the stalactites are the result of 200 years of waste disposal exhalations. A strong indicator of the historical presence of Camorra — and of well “grounded” detrimental social, political and cultural attitudes toward the public good (to the costs of people’s health, camorristi included). Camorra’s power structure is horizontal, unlike the hierarchical one of Cosa Nostra. Distinct clans operate largely autonomously without a single leader — each clan has its own boss. Alliances can be created between clans; that is when Camorra functions like a single organization. Coalitions are maintained only as long as there is equilibrium of power and reciprocal benefits. Sometimes, a inter-organized crime alliances can be created: the Casalesi, a group of confederate families, is allied with the Calabria 'Ndrangheta and Sicily Cosa Nostra. According to the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs (2009) Camorra counted between 100 and 200 clans, for approximately 10,000 formal members and 50,000 associate: an army. The area of operation in Italy is mainly in the following regions: Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Tuscany, Marche, Umbria, Molise, Lazio, Basilicata. Camorra’s international ramifications can be found mainly in: Eastern Europe, France, The Netherlands, Spain, Scotland, Portugal, Latin America (Colombia), United States, Canada. All of this to say: Camorra cannot be considered just a local phenomenon.
In its early
incarnations the main illegal activities were local criminal and patronage
structures, escalating to extortion and 'taxes' on illegal activities, such as
prostitution. Later Camorra interests
expanded to counterfeiting, money laundering and smuggling, primarily of drugs.
Camorra’s infiltration of local bodies and public administration is evident:
the province of Naples has had the most instances of city councils dissolving
(44 cases between 1991 and 2007) owing to suspected ties to the Camorra.
One of
the most recent criminal “opportunities” for the Camorra is the waste
management industry. Hundreds of companies contract the organization’s clans
for the disposal of toxic waste; the waste is disposed in a number of ways,
including burying it and burning it. The market cost for disposing of toxic
waste is between USD 0.21 and USD 0.62 per kg. Camorra offers the same service
for a mere USD 0.09 per kg. According to
Italian environmental organization Legambiente,
waste trafficking earns organized crime groups around EUR 22 billion (USD 32
billion) per year. Out of the drug trafficking (mainly cocaine) the sole clan
Di Lauro earns approximately EUR 300 million (USD 439 million) per year. The
annual revenues of the Camorra are around EUR 16 billion (USD 23 billion). Camorristi
define themselves “entrepreneurs”.
From another
sociological point of view, Camorra has of course a locally based identity
which strengthens its social base. The majority of residents have some interest
in maintaining the existing system: the family-based clan structure ensures
that most residents have family or friendship links to Camorra associates,
making it less likely that anyone would betray the group. Camorra offers its
own social network, a sense of community (although illegal), and jobs for
unemployed young people (cigarette smuggling, drugs or minor crime). Now the
approximate meaning of camorra — “organization” — makes more sense. The members
of the Camorra prefer to use the word “sistema”, or system, to identify their
criminal organization, viewing the group structure as analogous to a business
system. Felia Allum, in Becoming a camorrista: criminal culture and life
choices in Naples, points out an interesting qualitative and cultural
analysis. At its origins, Camorra had a code of conduct for its members — values
such as defending one’s honour, respect for all, prestige, personal vendetta
and power. According to Allum, by the 1980s these basic traditional values had
been manipulated and transformed by the Camorra subculture into new values,
based predominantly around business: respect for power and money, strategic use
of friends and family, greed. In a certain way, joining nowadays the Camorra
becomes a “shortcut to success” — which is not a biographical path that can be
relegated only to the organized crime world. The ’50 core values (honour,
family and friendship), where transformed in the 80’s to money, social prestige
and, most of all, power: “Beyond
the craving for wealth which is undoubtedly an important motive in criminal
activities, the Mafia’s paramount aim is power” (Siebert 1996, 61). And this kind of
neo-feudal system of ‘power’, means the control over a territory, over the
lives of the people, over social and political activities, over everything: “in
its abrogation of absolute power to itself, the power over life and death”
(Siebert, 62).
Exhibitionism
is another piece of this cultural mosaic: “Unfortunately, pathologically, we are
exhibitionists, real exhibitionists, you do not undertake a crime if you do
not want people to talk about it”
(Boss Umberto Ammaturo, Tribunale di Napoli 1994).
Allum’s
concluding remark is: “The changes in
motivation for joining
the Camorra during the period we have studied reflect closely those of the capitalist society and culture in which it
operates and of which it has become the very epitome” (2001, 343).
Other
scholarly synthetic propositions, attempting to capture the gist of the South Italy’s social and cultural phenomenology
are: “great social disintegration”
(Gramsci 1930); “amoral familism” (Banfield 1958) ; lack of in “social capital” (Putnam 1993; Fukuyama
1995). Much more can be written about the relationship between organized crime
and others socio-cultural features supporting the Italian modernization process.
I would
like to finish this scattered reflection with a question. To which
statement you feel closer?
1) “In general, it’s worth to trust
people”;
2) “You can’t trust people, they will
take advantage of you”.
The 70% of
young Italians (25-35 years) picked the
second statement (Iard 2007). In Italy, young people have one of the lowest levels
of “institutional” and “interpersonal” trust within the Western world. The
passage from low trust in Otherness, low trust in the future and low trust in
yourself does not sounds as an hazardous conceptual consequential chain to me. Are
these young people proud to be Italian?
In 2007 one
of my students (Georgetown University) wrote about his pride of being American:
“I am personally proud to say I am an American.
“I am personally proud to say I am an American.
I am not proud of everything America does and
stands for.
But I have learned to love my home.
If I didn't love it, I wouldn't have any care or concern to try to change it for the better”.
But I have learned to love my home.
If I didn't love it, I wouldn't have any care or concern to try to change it for the better”.
- ALLUM, F. (2001) Becoming
a camorrista: criminal culture
and life choices in Naples, in “Journal of Modern Italian Studies”, 6, 3:
324–347.
-
BANFIELD, E.G. (1958) The
Moral Basis of a Backward Society. Glencoe: Free Press.
-
IARD (2007) Sesta
indagine dell’Istituto Iard sulla condizione giovanile in Italia. Bologna: Il
Mulino.
-
COVINO, M. (2009) La
Malavita: Gomorrah and Naples, in “Film Quarterly”, 62, 4: 72-75.
-
FBI, Organized
Crime in Italy, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/lcnindex.htm.
-
FUKUYAMA, F. (1995) Trust.
New York: Free Press.
-
GAMBETTA, D. (1996) The
Sicilian Mafia. Harvard: University Press.
- GRAMSCI, A. (1926/1983) The Southern Question, in The Modern Prince and Other Writings,
ed. L. Marks. New York: International Publishers.
-
PINE, J. (2008) Icons
and iconoclasm: Roberto Saviano's Gomorrah and La Denuncia, in “Journal of
Modern Italian Studies”,13, 3: 431-436.
-
PUTNAM, R.D. (1993) Making
Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton: University
Press.
-
SHELLEY, L.I. (1994) Mafia and the Italian State: the Historical Roots of the Current Crisis,
in “Sociological Forum”, 9, 4: 661-672.
-
SIEBERT, R. (1996) Secrets of Life and Death: Women
and the Mafia, London: Verso.
- Tribunale di Napoli, V Sezione Penale, RG
3952/November 1992, Contro Alfieri Carmine + 9, verbale di
udienza: Pasquale Galasso (a 15 November 1993), Carmine Alfieri (b 22 April
1994, c 4 May 1994, d 5 May 1994), (e 13 April 1994), (f 17 February 1994),
Carmine Schiavone, Umberto Ammaturo (d 5 May 1994).
Gracefully written information on this blog are going to support me for my coming assignments. Every point was very clear and taught me few new parameters. I would like to use this information in coming future.kindvriendelijk vakantiehuis
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